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Abstract: The Constitutional Tribunal and legal science derived the principle of competent 
legislation from among numerous principles stemming from the concept of a democratic legal 
state (article 2 of the Constitution of 1997). This principle consists of a range of detailed 
elements, the normative content of which constitutes the principle of the citizen’s confidence in 
the state and the law established by it, legal certainty and legality. The major components of this 
principle are as follows: the principle lex retro non agit, the principle vacatio legis, the principle 
of the protection of acquired rights, the principle of determinacy of legal rules. Additionally, the 
following principles have been distinguished: the principle pacta sunt servanta, the prohibition of 
changes in the tax law during a tax year, the requirement to protect the interests in progress as 
well as the requirement to specify the guidelines concerning the content of a regulation. The 
subject of this article consists of the analysis of the principle, which directly relates to the 
linguistic aspect of law - the principle of determinacy of legal rules. To be an effective means of 
communication between a legislator and those subject to established norms, legal language must 
be subject to certain requirements, which stem from the described principle. The essence of the 
principle of determinacy of legislation consists in the obligation to create laws with correct, 
precise and clear content. Due to the limited space of this study, I will confine myself to the 
problem of substantiating the binding force of the discussed principle, its content, exemplification 
of its violation by a legislator, factors affecting the level of determinacy in a particular case as 
well as the scope of unconstitutionality of legal rules that do not comply with the established 
requirements. 
 
NAKAZ OKREŚLONOŚCI PRZEPISÓW PRAWNYCH JAKO ELEMENT ZASADY 
PRZYZWOITEJ LEGISLACJI 
 
Abstrakt: Wśród wielu zasad wywodzonych z koncepcji demokratycznego państwa prawnego 
(art. 2 Konstytucji z 1997 r.) Trybunał Konstytucyjny i nauka prawa wyprowadziły zasadę 
przyzwoitej legislacji. Zasada ta składa się z szeregu szczegółowych elementów, których treścią 
normatywną jest realizacja zasady zaufania obywateli do państwa i stanowionego przez nie 
prawa, pewności prawa oraz zasady legalizmu. Głównymi składowymi zasady są: zasada lex retro 
non agit, zasada vacatio legis, zasada ochrony praw nabytych oraz zasada określoności przepisów 
prawnych. Dodatkowo wyodrębniono: zasadę pacta sunt servanta, zakaz dokonywania zmian  
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w prawie podatkowym w trakcie roku podatkowego, nakaz ochrony interesów w toku oraz nakaz 
określania wytycznych dotyczących treści rozporządzenia. Przedmiotem artykułu jest analiza 
zasady odnoszącej się bezpośrednio do językowego aspektu prawa – zasady określoności -
przepisów prawnych. Język prawny, aby był skutecznym środkiem porozumiewania 
ustawodawcy z adresatami stanowionych norm prawnych musi podlegać określonym wymogom, 
których źródłem jest opisywana zasada. Istota zasady określoności przepisów prawnych wyraŜa 
się w obowiązku tworzenia przepisów, których treść powinna być poprawna, precyzyjna i jasna. 
Z uwagi na okrojone ramy niniejszego opracowania ograniczam się do omówienia problemu 
uzasadnienia obowiązywania omawianej zasady, jej treści, egzemplifikacji naruszeń przez 
prawodawcę, czynników rzutujących na poziom określoności w konkretnym przypadku oraz 
zakresu niekonstytucyjności przepisów niespełniających stawianych wymagań. 
 
In legal theory, the process of legislating is considered as an organised set of actions, 
accomplished in established forms, the course of which is substantially defined by 
binding legal standards. The beginning of this process constitutes “making an intention 
by a given entity to make a change in social life by means of legal norms,” and the 
subsequent stages constitute preparation and consideration of the draft of a legislative 
act and making it effective (Wronkowska and Ziembiński 2001,128). Legislation is an 
organised and deliberate process, guided by specified legal principles.58 The principles 
of legislation shall mean directives with a large degree of generality directed to entities 
creating law, which specify how legislators should settle particular problems arising 
during legislation and guide the process of making the law so that these problems might 
be properly resolved59 (Michalska and Wronkowska 1983, 55). It should be stressed that 
these principles do not directly indicate the features of the law, but how to enact it so 
                                                          
58 The concept of legal principles has not been unequivocally specified yet. One of the divisions 
developed in the doctrine (to which I will refer further in this study) is the division into principles 
of the directival and descriptive meaning. This dichotomy relates to expressions of such nature 
distinguished in science. Directival expressions specify an order or ban to behave in a particular 
way in certain circumstances, they are justified ethically (they are compulsory, because they are 
established by the entity that wields authority over those subject to the order or ban) or 
axiologically (the code of conduct is binding because it is preferred or negated due to certain 
values). Alternatively, descriptive expression is represented by means of statements of a logical 
definitative sense. Accordingly, legal principles in a directival sense include norms of conduct, 
which have thetic or axiomatic justification of its validity. Norms included in these principles are 
considered to be norms of a given system, they are to some extent superior to other norms. 
Among the directival principles one may distinguish the principles of a legal system construction 
(II degree) and substantive principles concerning particular legal institutions, rights and 
obligations of the subject of law etc (I degree). These principles are legally valid. Legal principles 
of descriptive meaning (beyond directival sense) have educational purposes and they are intended 
to form the description of a legal system, indicating functional relations between norms as well as 
presenting the social role of a given norm, institution or branch of law (more: Wronkowska et 
al.1974, 28-72.) 
59 The issues concerning legislation are described in details in i.a. (Bafia 1980; Bałaban et. al, 
1986; Wróblewski 1989).  
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that it may comply with certain requirements concerning its content and form (Bafia 
1980, 86-94). Among the entirety of legislative principles one may distinguish those 
that are based on the text of a normative act (so-called principles – legal criteria) and 
those without any normative character (so-called principles – postulates in legal 
doctrine)60.  
The distinctive feature of the concept of legislative principles developed in the 
Polish legal science is its broad understanding. They embrace the principles of editing 
legal texts, aiming at implementation of the rationality postulate of a legislator, and, at 
the same time, legal certainty and legal safety (which will be described broadly 
hereinafter), the principles intended to stabilise of the political system as well as those 
concerning the legislative procedure (Zalasiński 2008, s.28). 
According to the classification of legislative principles performed by  
A. Michalska and S. Wronkowska, one of these groups constitutes the principles, which 
stipulate the optimal text formulation of normative acts (more: Zalasiński 2008, 55-69). 
According to the formulated recommendation, the text of the act should be unequivocal, 
concise and perspicuous to its readers. The complement to this group of principles 
constitutes the postulate demanding the comprehensive regulation of the domains of 
social life, avoidance of casuistry as well as direct repealing of hitherto valid regulations 
by a new statute. It should be mentioned that since the Constitutional Tribunal 
commenced jurisdictional activity, many of the legislative directives formulated hitherto 
in the doctrine have obtained the status of constitutional legal principles61, which, with 
                                                          
60 According to the concept of legislation developed in the doctrine, this division concerns the 
principles understood in a directive way. Jerzy Wróblewski is an author of the concept of division 
of legal principles (more: Wróblewski 1959, 255-260). The principles – legal norms, which are 
based on a legal text, are of fundamental importance for teaching and practising law. In order to 
portray the scope of the subjectoptimally, it should be mentioned that there are different stances 
on the doctrine concerning the validity of legal principles. J. Wróblewski distinguished valid 
principles of a legal system (based on legal norms or interpreted by means of inferential 
conclusions) as well as non-valid postulates of a legal system (not based on legal texts). 
According to the evolutional predominant stance, the validity of principles may stem from the 
system of uniform axiomatic or praxeomatic substantiation for the principles of a given group of 
norms. (more: Wronkowska et al. 1974, 55-64) 
61 The essence of a constitutional principle of law amounts to understanding it as a directival 
statement, being a legal norm, included directly in the constitution or resulting from it, which 
significant meaning consists in determining the direction of the interpretation of all the norms of 
the legal system. (More: Zalasiński 2004, 22-29; Zalasiński 1997, 58-76) The superior role of 
constitutional principles in respect of other norms of the legal system results not only from the 
fact that they are included in the act of the highest validity in the hierarchy of legal sources 
(which implies the prevention of their repeal by the norms of a lower range and for the non-
contradiction of these norms with them), but also from the fact that they determine the formal 
legislative basis (because they indicate competence to establish norms) and they determine the 
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the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court developed with time, have made a great 
impact on the form of the principle of competent legislation.  
One of the results of the implementation of the Act of 29.12.1989 on the 
change of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland62, formally including the 
concept of the legal state of the Polish legal system63, was the introduction of values 
related to this concept (mainly owing to the jurisdictional activity of the Constitutional 
Tribunal). One of these values, which directly affect the principle of competent 
legislation, is the principle of the citizen’s confidence in the state and the law 
established by it as well as legal certainty64. The Constitutional Tribunal has repeatedly 
stressed the significance of competent legislation in numerous judgments stating that in 
a democratic legally based state it is one of the fundamental principles determining the 
relationship between the state and citizens (the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal 
with file reference number P 3/00, OTK ZU No. 5/2000). The aforementioned principle 
is based on the value of legal certainty (Zieliński 1996, 43-58), which in the jurisdiction 
is defined as a set of elements features aiming at providing the individual with legal 
safety. Furthermore, the most fundamental objective of legal safety is to provide citizens 
with the possibility of deciding upon their own conduct on the basis of knowledge of the 
actions of state authorities and the legal consequences of these actions (Zieliński 1996, 
43-58). Legal certainty so understood is, according to the Tribunal, the basis and 
guarantee of the citizens’ confidence in the state and the law established by it (judgment 
with file reference number P 14/03 OTK ZU Nr 7/A/2004 item. 62). The state has a 
number of obligations resulting from this principle. The main responsibilities are as 
follows: formulating the law so that it does not restrict the liberties of citizens, an 
obligation to grant rights to individuals and simultaneously to guarantee the possibility 
of fulfilling them, an obligation to make the law coherent and comprehensible for 
citizens and not to enact legal rules retroactively - in compliance with the principle lex 
                                                                                                                                              
substantive direction of legisation (they indicate the objectives which are to be fulfilled as a result 
of legislation ). (More: Wronkowska et al. 1974, 64-65). 
62 Dz. U. 1989, Nr 75, poz. 444.  
63 Rechtsstaat was the model concept of a legally based state; it was developed in the German 
legal doctrine and consisted of: the principle of the division of power; the principle of 
fundamental rights protection, the principle of subjecting the legislative power to the Constitution 
and the judicial and executive powers to the statutes; the principle of legal protection when 
actions of public authorities are against the law as well as the principle of legal safety. The 
Constitutional Tribunal interpreted the principles in relation to the achievements accomplished in this 
field by the German juridical doctrine. (More: Spyra 2003, 55-56, and the literature quoted here).  
64 These principles before making amendments to the Constitution by the aforementioned Act 
were connected to the article 8 sec.1 of the Constitution (by the principle of substantive 
lawfulness). Then it was recognised by the Constitutional Tribunal as the directive directly 
resulting from the principle of astate based on law. This stance established itself after the 
Constitution of 1997 came into force (More: Zalasiński 2008, 35-41) 
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retro non agit (judgment with file reference number K 27/01 OTK ZU No. 7/2001, item 
209, quoted in: Potrzeszcz 2007, 217). 
It should be stressed that the confidence of citizens in the state and the law 
established by it as well as legal certainty (including the assurance of legal safety to the 
individuals) is of great significance for the implementation of human rights. The 
predictability of the individual’s own actions and legal consequences constitutes the 
realisation of liberty whereas respect of the legal order towards the individual as a 
rational and autonomous being means respect for the individual’s dignity (more: 
Potrzeszcz 2007, 217-256). 
Among many elements constituting the principle of the citizen’s confidence in 
the state and the law established by it and legal certainty, which stems from the concept 
of a democratic legal law (which the Constitution of 1997 included as article 265), legal 
science and the Constitutional Tribunal introduced the principle of competent 
legislation66. This principle consists of a number of detailed elements, the normative 
content of which is the implementation of the principle of legalism. The component 
directives of the principle constitute the system of guidelines directed to the legislator, 
specifying how the law may be changed. The principle of competent legislation consists 
of four main elements: the principle lex retro non agit67, the principle vacatio legis68, 
the principle of the protection of acquired rights (more: Zalasiński 2008, 106 and 
subsequent), as well as the principle of the determinacy of legal rules. The additional 
principles, which add more details to the aforementioned, are as follows: the principle 
pacta sunt servanta, the prohibition on making changes in the tax law during a tax year, 
the injunction to protect the interests in progress, the order to specify the guidelines 
concerning the content of a regulation69.  
The subject of this article is the analysis of the principle related to the linguistic 
aspect of law – the principle of determinacy of legal rules. Legal language is perceived 
as a means of communication between the legislator and the subjects of established 
norms. In order to become an effective tool, this means must be subject to certain 
                                                          
65 The article 2 of the Constitution of 1997 reads: ”The Republic of Poland is a democratic legal 
state implementing the principles of social justice”. 
66 I.a. the judgments with file reference number 24/00 OTK ZU Nr 3/2001, item 51; K 13/01 OTK 
ZU No. 4/2001 item 81; U 1/01 OTK ZU No. 8/2001, item 247. The principle of proper 
legislation, including the principle of the determinacy of legal rules belongs to the so-called 
formal content of the principles of a legal state (more: Morawska 2003, 221-229).  
67 The essence of the principle manifests itself in the prohibition of evaluation of the facts, which 
occured during the validity of superceded statutes (more: Lang 1962, 234).  
68 The term vacatio legis In juriprudence is defined as the period between publishing the law (or 
enacting it – in the case of statutes not requiring publication) to the time of its implementation 
(more: Seidler et al. 2001, 180; Myślińska 2009, 6 – 9). 
69 The last of the established injunction was discussed i.a. in: Salitra 2003, 49-52. 
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requirements, which stem from the principle of the determinacy of legal rules 
(Wronkowska 2006, 684). Its essence amounts to the obligation of enacting laws, which 
have correct, precise and clear content. The quality, which differentiates the principle of 
determinacy from other principles – elements, of the principle of decent legislation – is 
its absolute nature70. Due to the limited scope of this study, I will restrict myself to the 
selected issues, namely to the problem of substantiating the effective validity of the 
discussed principle, its content, exemplification of its violation by the legislator, factors 
affecting the level of determinacy in a particular instance as well as the scope of 
unconstitutionality of legal rules that do not comply with the established requirements.  
Formulating the content of the principle of determinacy of legal rules in the 
initial period (prior to the jurisdictional activity by the Constitutional Tribunal) 
remained the domain of legal doctrine. The injunction of sufficient clarity of a legal text 
had two meanings at this time: material and formal. The material meaning consisted in 
forming the legal system ensuring comprehensibility and transparency for the subjects - 
citizens. On the other hand, the formal meaning consisted of formulating the legal rules, 
which enabled establishment of unequivocal legal norms. According to such an 
understanding of the injunction, the content of a legal rule shall be precise, coherent and 
with no internal contradictionsi (Zalasiński 2008, 183).  
The other directive constituting the discussed principle, the term “legal 
determinacy,” was adopted in Poland from the German legal doctrine, where it was 
treated as an element of the concept of a law based state - Rechtsstaat. In accordance 
with its narrow definition, the content of a legal rule should be precise to such an extent 
that a legal norm could be established from it. Broad understanding of the postulate, 
which predominated in the German legal doctrine, imposed on the legislator an 
obligation to make legal rules transparent and comprehensible for individuals71. With 
the adoption of the concept of a law based state to the Polish legal order, the hitherto 
predominating term “clarity”’ was replaced with the term of narrower scope – 
“determinacy” of legal rules, which essentially amounted to the injunction requiring law 
that is comprehensible for the citizens (Zalasiński 2008, 185). 
 Constitutional adoption of the discussed principle was a complex process. It 
originated from the concept of a state based on law, which was consolidated in the 
Polish legal order, the evolution of the constitutional system as well as the jurisdiction 
of the Constitutional Tribunal72. It should be stressed that this process has not yet been 
completed. Both in the doctrine and the jurisdiction of the Polish Constitutional Court 
                                                          
70 Some exceptions to the rest of the aforementioned principles might be allowed.  
71 Broad understanding of the order predominates currently in the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Tribunal.   
72 The determinacy principle of legal rules was not acknowledged as a legal principle until the 
beginning of the 1990s. 
Marzena Myślińska, “The Principle of Determinacy of Legal…” 
 131
there are unequivocal stances for the discussed principle and for limits of its content. 
Before the official adoption of the concept of a law based state, the Constitutional 
Tribunal established the requirement to create clear, comprehensible and precise legal 
rules from the principle of the citizens’ confidence in the state and the law established 
by itii (I.a. the judgment TK K 7/89, OTK 1989/1/8.). After its introduction, the 
Constitutional Court started to perceive the order as a norm of making the legal rules of 
criminal law, which was based on the principle of determinacy of prohibited acts under 
penalty (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) as well as the prohibition of retroactive 
validity of the statute introducing or increasing criminal responsibility (lex severior 
retro non agit).iii. These principles, similarly to the principle of excessive interference as 
well as the principle of citizens’ confidence in the state and legal certainty, were 
realised in article 1 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Poland, amended by 
the Act of the 29th of December 1989 quoted above. The established regulation was 
acknowledged with time as the constitutional basis for the principle of determinacy of 
legal rules.  
After implementing the fundamental law, which is currently in force, as a result of 
incorporating the basis of principles previously derived from article 1 in its other 
regulations, some discrepancies concerning the constitutional source of the determinacy 
of legal rules appeared in the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal. The 
Constitutional Tribunal based it on the principle of proportionality specified in article 
31 sec. 3 of the Constitution73, the principle of legal safety (article 2) as well as the 
principle nullum crimen sine lege (article 42). According to the currently predominating 
stance (although it is not unequivocal) the grounds for the principle of determinacy of 
legal rules constitute the principle of a law based state described in article 2 of the 
Constitution, more precisely – the principle of citizens’ confidence in the thus resulting 
stateiv (I.a. judgment TK 24/00 (OTK 2001/3/51); SK 70/06 (OTK 2007/9A/103); more: 
Spyra 2003, 53.  
According to T. Zalasiński (the view expressed with T. Spyra) the sense of the 
remaining principles, which derived from the article 2 of the Constitution, constitutes an 
additional substantiation of the validity of the discussed principle in relation to the 
specific, ensuing state of affairsv (Zalasiński 2008, 192). The content of the principle of 
the determinacy of legal rules from the beginning of the judicial activity of the 
Constitutional Tribunal has not been unequivocally determined to this day. Firstly, it 
embraced only repressive legal principles (especially those of criminal law), which 
                                                          
73 The Constitutional Tribunal currently emphasises that the principle of determinacy should be 
related to the article 31 sec. 3 of the Constitution especially when a regulation formulated by the 
legislator concerns the protection of constitutional rights and liberties of man and citizen, i.a. in 
the judgment K 19/99 (OTK 2001/2/ 30).  
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interfere directly with the rights and liberties of an individual74. The control of 
requirements imposed by the legislator, which stem from the determinacy principle, 
amounted then to the study of stipulations included in the legal rule in respect of 
violating the principle of proportionality and statutory exclusion. With time, the 
determinacy principle encompassed all the legal rules, and its content was extended by 
the legal clarity postulate. It was emphasised that any legal text not only should have 
precise content, but it should also be comprehensible to its subject recipientsvi 
(Zalasiński 2008, 195).  
 At the current stage of development, the determinacy principle of legal rules is 
defined by the three following features: correctness (in semantic respect – the use of 
proper words, including correct use of so-called under specified expressions and blanket 
clauses), precision (unequivocalness of meaning) and clarity (related to its 
comprehensibility to the subject recipients), (Zalasiński 2008, 198). The essence of the 
discussed principle in its current form was expressed by the Constitutional Tribunal in 
the judgment with file reference number K 24/00, which states “each regulation shall be 
formed correctly in linguistic and logical aspects.” Further in the judgment, the Court 
explained that the clarity of a regulation shall mean “an injunction to form regulations 
that are transparent and comprehensible for its subject recipients, which may expect 
from a rational legislator legal norms which raise no doubts in respect of imposed 
obligations and granted rights. The precision of a regulation, related to the clarity, 
should be manifested in the exactness of imposed obligations and granted rights so that 
their content is clear and enables their enforcement”vii (judgment with file reference 
number OTK 2001/3/51; quoted in: Zalasiński 2008, 198).   
 The study of the constitutionality of a regulation in respect of its compliance 
with the determinacy principle of legal rules (and thus with the principle of competent 
legislation resulting from the article 2) starts with examining the level of its correctness. 
It includes the correctness of the rules of spelling, formal logic, and the rules of the 
proper form of legal texts included in the annex to the regulation of the Council of 
Ministers of the 20th of July 2002 – The Principles of Legislative Technique75. The next 
stage is the analysis of a regulation in respect of its precision and clarity. The study of 
precision consists in examining if it is sufficiently unequivocal to prevent too broad and 
discretionary application of a legal norm included in it (it is related to its flexibility)76, 
                                                          
74 Due to such a form of the principle, it was called “the principle of determinacy of criminal legal 
rules” In the first half of the 19th century (More: Zalasiński 2008, 187).  
75 Journal of Laws of 2002, No.100 entry 908. 
76 To find more information about flexibility of a legal text see in: Wronkowska and Zieliński 
1993, 103- 114. The authors regard adequacy as the most fundamental and, at the same time, 
necessary quality of a legal text. Adequacy ensures the appropriate level of flexibility and 
precision (unequivocalness) of a text. Flexibility of a text serves two fundamental functions. The 
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(Zalasiński 2008, 201). The clarity of a regulation is connected with the material aspect 
of the determinacy principle of legal rules discussed above. Its essence amounts to the 
study of the regulation’s content with regard to the comprehensibility of included legal 
norms for the recipients. It should be stressed that a legal text should be sufficiently 
comprehensible so that “an average citizen,” who does not know any professional 
methods of analysis of the language of normative acts, could interpret properly the legal 
norms included in itviii (Morawska 2002, 370). 
 The doctrine stipulates that each assessment of the constitutionality of a 
regulation (edited not in conformity with the principle of determinacy of legal rules and 
thus with the principle of competent legislation) should be made taking into 
consideration the developed guidance on legal considerations. The presence of 
discrepancies in the judicature in relation to the same case may suggest the 
indeterminacy of the applied regulation and thus it might be deemed unconstitutional. In 
the case of uniformity of the jurisdiction the Constitutional Tribunal should in turn 
check if this state ensures the sufficient level of legal certainty (especially if 
interpretation of the law enables the recipient to have an adequate knowledge of his/her 
legal situation). T. Spyra emphasises the fact that “the assessment of legal certainty 
must be of a comprehensive nature and it must embrace a number of additional factors, 
such as: the actual level of the availability of jurisdiction or professional legal help in 
the society”77. Additionally, one must determine the degree of the legislator's fault in 
introducing a given set of legal rules to the system. The legislator’s mistake may be 
manifested, for instance, in referring to a concept or regulation that does not exist.  
A gross error of a legislator, which violates the determinacy principle, is a factor 
suggesting the unconstitutionality of a normative act including a flawed regulation. 
Furthermore, the Tribunal should each time examine the effects of its removal from the 
legal system. Moreover, the refusal to state unconstitutionality due to the negative 
effects of the rejection of a legal rule from the legal system may occur only 
exceptionallyix (Spyra 2003, 74).  
                                                                                                                                              
first one consists in the necessity of prediction and taking into account by the legislator of the 
changeability of a regulated situation at the moment of the text creation. The other function 
consists of the necessity of the edition of a legal text in such a way that expressions could 
encompass ensuing situations in the future. Underspecified expressions and blanket clauses 
ensure the flexibility of a legal text. The use of underspecified expressions is possible only when 
it is efficient – which each time requires indicating the subject, that decides upon the use of 
fuzziness and defining the criteria of determining the limits of this fuzziness. The additional 
means to ensure the flexibility of a legal text is determining in this text the limits of freedom of the 
decision made by the legislator, for instance by determining limits of jurisdiction in particular cases; 
77 When constitutionality verification is performed after a short period of the law being valid, its 
indeterminacy does not signify the possibility of deeming it unconstitutional. In such a case, the 
potential possibility of decreasing the legal uncertainty by jurisdiction is unimportant (Spyra 2003, 73). 
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Taking into account the so far considerable judicial achievements of the 
Constitutional Tribunal concerning the principle of competent legislation, one may 
distinguish some flaws in legal acts, which lead to the violation of the determinacy 
principle of legal rules. One of the most frequent flaws is the use of unclear terms by the 
legislator, which are legally indeterminate and their interpretation brings divergent 
results. Inaccurate, unclear and highly indeterminate edition of a legal rule, which 
excludes the possibility of determining the precise content of the legal norm included in 
it, evokes uncertainty among its subject recipients in respect of granted rights and 
imposed obligations78 (judgment with file reference number SK 42/05). The 
defectiveness of a legal act may lead to the violation of the determinacy principle as 
well as the lack of adequate terminological precision79. The problem is caused mainly 
by the violation of the directive included in §10 of the annex to the regulation of the 
Prime Minister of the 20th of June 2002 concerning the Principles of Legislative 
Technique, according to which “identical terms are used for identical concepts, and 
various concepts may not be named with identical terms”80.81 Such a state of affairs may 
lead to conditions violating the individual’s rights. The additional consequence of the 
lack of terminological precision may be the preclusion from applying regulations with 
                                                          
78 source: http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/index2.htm 
79 The issue of unequivocalness and precision of words in a legal text more: Malinowski 2006, 18 
– 42. On the other hand, Sławomira Wronkowska and Maciej Zieliński stress that a text is 
terminologically precise when it is without any syntactic and lexical ambiguities. This ambiguity 
of expressions is considered as an editorial error irrespective of the type of language in which it 
occurs (the same mistake may be ambiguous in respect of ethnic language, but unambiguous in 
respect of legal language). Lexical ambiguity may be avoided by introducing some legal 
definitions into a legal text or by placing ambiguous words in context so that ambiguity may be 
avoided. Definitions included in legal texts – so called legal definitions – may occur in different 
forms (these are, for instance, equational classical and non-classical definitions, partial definitions 
(more: Wronkowska and Zieliński 1993, 115 – 138). By placing legal definitions of some 
ambiguous expressions, a legislator explicitly specifies how it should be understood within a legal 
act, in which the definition was included and within executive deeds to the act, in which it was 
placed. The broader scope of the use of legal definitions relates to the situation, when they are 
placed in acts of a fundamental nature for a given domain of social relations, for instance in 
codes. In such cases definition determines a proper understanding of an ambiguous expression in 
the act belonging to the same domain of social relations (Choduń 2007, 128).  
80 Dz. U. z 2002, Nr 100, poz. 908 
81 The issue of the lack of precision of the terms used by a legislator was examined by the 
Tribunal e.g. in the judgment with file reference number K 14/03 (OTK 2004/1A/1), in which it 
stated the unconstitutionality of the Act of the 23rd of January 2003 on general insurance in 
National Health Fund (Journal of Laws of 2003, No. 45 entry 391 with later amendments). 
According to the Tribunal, a legislator formed the institution “in the form which precludes its 
reliable and efficient work” due to the lack of precision of regulations. ” (Quoted in: Salitra, 
Zasady przyzwoitej legislacji w 2003, 47). 
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such terms82, especially, when "the regulation allows for too much freedom (or even 
arbitrariness) of interpretation for the bodies applying this regulation. In effect, it leads 
to the situation when the bodies applying the law are forced to stand in for the legislator, 
who regulated the issues necessary for the settlement in an unclear and 
incomprehensible way.” The Constitutional Tribunal emphasised the fact that leaving 
too much freedom for the bodies applying the law may not lead to arbitrariness in 
defining the objective and subjective scope of the content of regulations (i.a. judgments 
with file reference numbers K28/02, K 4/06 and K 44/07)83. It must be explained that 
the determinacy principle resulting from the constitutional principle of a legal state does 
not mean that the legislator may not use under specified terms. The legislator is required 
to meet one condition in this respect, namely designations must be precisely 
determined. According to the Tribunal, the sense of under specified terms in a given 
situation cannot be arbitrarily determined, their use demands the presence of special 
procedural guarantees, which would ensure the transparency and easy assessment of the 
practice of providing some vague terms with actual content (I.a. judgments with file 
reference numbers SK 30/05 and K 4/06,)84.   
 The next example of a flaw occurring in normative acts, which result in the 
violation of the determinacy principle of legal rules is incorrect or excessive number of 
references within one legal act (or the whole legal system). Multiple references placed 
in legal acts constitute another frequent phenomenon - a regulation has numerous 
inexact references included by a legislator (Działocha and Zalasiński 2006, 11)85. The 
Tribunal emphasised the fact that formulating legal definitions, which contain 
successive references, especially when defining the prohibited act, is inadmissible. The 
logical mistake of explaining the unknown by the unknown (ignotum per ignotum86) 
violates the principle of legally based state (i.a. judgments with file reference numbers: 
K 41/02 and K 14/03)87. 
 The frequent cause of the violation of the objective principle is also making 
amendments to legal acts by change/addition of legal rules “which do not comply with 
other legal rules of a given legal act,” and also by making amendments frequently and 
                                                          
82 I.a. judgments with file reference numbers K 44/02 (OTK 2003/5A/44), K 19/99 (OTK 
2001/2/30). (Quoted in: Salitra 2003, 47). 
83 source: http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/index2.htm. 
84 source: http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/index2.htm. 
85 The issue of multiple references was examined by the Constitutional Tribunal i.a. in the 
judgment with file reference number K 20/03 (OTK 2004/7A/63) concerning regulation of the 
Act of the 23rd of November 2002 on the amendment to the Act on local government of a 
commune and amendments to some other acts (Journal of LawsDz. U. z 2002, Nr 214 poz.1806). 
86 This mistake consists of explaining (defining) of the meaning of a defined expression by means of an 
expression which is incomprehensible to the recipient of the definition, more: Nawrot 2007, 88-89). 
87 source: http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/index2.htm. 
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without uniformity. Introduction of any changes violating the legislative techniques 
certainly has a negative impact on the level of legal clarity and transparency. In effect, 
the regulations of material law become distorted and the institutions of formal law do 
not operate properly (Działocha and Zalasiński 2006, 13). In the judgment with file 
reference number K 53/02 (OTK 2003/8A/83)88, the judges of the Tribunal expressed 
their disapproval of “the way of indicating successive changes in the content of 
regulations by the sequence of legislative actions uncoordinated with one another, 
which results in gross ambiguities and requires taking excessively complicated 
interpretative measures” (OTK 2003/8A/83).  
The legislative correctness denotes also establishing legal rules consistently 
and logically, taking into account system-wide principles and axiomatic norms. 
Contradiction of the determinacy principle of legal rules will result in establishing in the 
legal system those regulations, which will make inconsistent law that cannot be 
explained in accordance with other legal rules. Purpose and correctness of enforcing 
regulations do not justify making law incidental and chaotic way. Such arbitrariness of 
enforcing the regulations constitutes a violation of the principle of correct legislation 
(judgment with file reference number P 28/07)89.  
  The directives of editing the legal rules, which result from the principle of 
correct legislation and concern the amendments to regulations, should be strictly 
adhered to, especially in the case of amendments to a code. The Tribunal has 
emphasised the fact that a legislator should refrain from making amendments in codes 
in an indirect way. It may result in a seemingly unchanged text being, in fact, 
substantially modified as far as its content is concerned by provisions of detailed acts. 
Avoidance of this problem is even more essential when an amendment concerns the 
norms of a fundamental nature, which regulate the main areas of particular legal 
institutions of a given branch of law (judgment with file reference number K 5/07)90.  
It should be stressed that depending on the subject of a given regulation, 
diversity in the levels of clarity, precision and correctness of legal laws is admissible. It 
mainly concerns the necessity of introducing specialist terminology (e.g. IT or medical 
terminologies) to the language of legal texts. In such a situation, the precision of a legal 
text may be ensured at the expense of its clarity (more: Zalasiński 2008, 213). 
According to T. Spyra, the higher the level of complexity of the regulated social 
relations, the lower the demand for determinacy should be, as he rightly stated (Spyra 
2003, 68). Concluding the deliberations concerning the monitoring of the 
constitutionality of regulations due to the violation of the determinacy rule, attention 
                                                          
88 The Tribunal states in the judgment the unconstitutionality of the Act of the 23rd of November 
2002 on the amendment to the Act on harbours and marine ports. 
89Source: http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/index2.htm. 
90Source: : http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/index2.htm. 
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should be paid to the currently prevailing position, according to which a regulation may 
be deemed unconstitutional due to violation any of the aforementioned features 
(especially limiting clarity or its precision) only when these “infringements” cannot be 
removed by means of the basic methods of the interpretation of the law (especially that 
performed by courts in the process of making law), (more: Zalasiński 2008, 212-214).    
In the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal it has been stressed many times 
that the determinacy principle becomes especially important in relation to legal rules which 
directly relate to the legal status of an individual (Judgments with file reference numbers K 
28/02 (OTK 2003/2A/13), K 37/02 (OTK 2003/9A/96), K 45/02 (OTK 2004/4A/30). To 
assess the compliance of a regulation with the principle of competent legislation, the 
Tribunal explains that each regulation, which makes laws and imposes obligations on 
citizens, should unequivocally indicate the subject recipient and circumstances to which it 
applies. The method of formulating the regulation should ensure uniform interpretation and 
application. The scope of its application should include the situations, which unequivocally 
indicate the purpose of the establishment of the regulation limiting the exercise of 
constitutional liberties and rights by a rational legislator (I.a. judgments with file reference 
numbers K 33/00 (OTK ZU 2001/7/ 217), K 47/04 and K 36/06) 91. 
The strictness of adherence to the determinacy principle of legal rules is 
dependent on the branch of law and the range of its subject recipients. The highest level 
of discipline in the legislator’s adherence to the objective principle is applied the 
regulations of a repressive nature (of criminal law), fiscal law, customs law, the 
regulations determining the scope of power of public authorities as well as those 
regulations that the subject recipients of which naturally have a limited ability to 
understand the legal content (Salitra 2003, 48) Regulations, which apply to the last 
category of people are mainly those concerning national insurance. The Constitutional 
Tribunal emphasised in the judgment with file reference number U 11/97 that the 
recipients of this branch of law are mainly elderly people, with limited possibilities in 
life, for whom the retirement and disability benefits are often the only source of income. 
That is why the violation of the discussed order constitutes “the determination of their 
rights in an unclear manner, with numerous and vague references, which prevents them 
from understanding the content of valid laws in this field and, at the same time, they 
exclude to a large extent control over the national insurance bodies” (judgment with file 
reference number: U 11/97 (OTK ZU 1997/5-6/67), quoted in: Salitra 2003, 48).   
With reference to repressive regulations, the precision and determinacy norms 
concerning regulations must be obeyed in the most restrictive manner in the branch of 
criminal law sensu stricte, especially those laws, which affect directly the fundamental 
liberties and rights guaranteed by the fundamental law (judgment with file reference 
                                                          
91 Source: http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/index2.htm. 
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number P 50/07) 92. According to the Tribunal, more freedom should be given to the 
regulations concerning offences, but the highest degree of freedom should be given in 
the branch of disciplinary law. The norm of criminal law in compliance with the 
determinacy principle should indicate in a consistent and unequivocal manner the 
subject recipient of a ban, features of a prohibited act and the type of penalty sanction 
for committing a breach of the prohibition. The Tribunal stressed many times that “the 
material elements of a criminal act must be defined in the law in a complete, precise and 
unequivocal manner” (judgments with file reference numbers K 2/02 (OTK 2003/1A/4), 
SK 13/05 (OTK 2005/8A/91), SK 42/05 (OTK 2006/10A/148), quoted in: Zalasiński 
2008, 199). The rule of determining the content of the regulations of criminal law in a 
precise and accurate manner is especially important in the face of the valid article 42, 
sec. 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, according to which only a person, 
who perpetrated a prohibited act under penalty by the law valid at the date of its 
perpetration is subject to criminal responsibility. Nevertheless, this principle does not 
exclude the possibility of punishment for an act, which constitutes a crime in 
accordance with the regulations of international law (judgments with file reference 
numbers SK 13/05 and P 50/07). The regulation states that the recipient of the norm of 
criminal law should know whether of his/her conduct and in which circumstances is 
subject to criminal responsibility. As far as the regulations of tax law are concerned, the 
Tribunal stated that they must ensure the highest responsibility and predictability in the 
decisions taken by the fiscal authorities (i.a. judgments with file reference numbers P 
13/02 (OTK 2002/7A/90), K 7/05 (OTK 2006/8A/107), quoted in: Zalasiński 2008, 
199).   Based on the tax law, the discussed order is even more important in the face of 
the valid article 84 of the Constitution. The established regulation stipulates that 
everybody is obliged to bear burdens and public benefits including the taxes stipulated 
in the act. The normative content of this act stipulates that the legislator has an 
obligation to establish the tax regulation in such a way that the legal norms determining 
the obligatory conduct of a taxpayer are precise and do not raise any doubts. 
Additionally, the obligation of the legislator is specified the article 217 of the 
Constitution, which imposes on the legislator the duty of determining in the act the 
essential elements of a tax obligation, which should be understood as the necessity of 
being extremely precise while determining the subject and object of taxation and tax 
rates (judgment with file reference number SK 39/06)93. 
A lower level of determinacy might be allowed in the normative acts including 
the regulation concerning private law, but within this scope a higher level of 
determinacy should characterise the regulations concerning the statue of limitations, 
                                                          
92 Source: http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/index2.htm. 
93 Source: http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/index2.htm. 
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expirations, indemnification liability, sanction of nullity as well as limitations of the 
freedom of contract (more: Spyra 2003, 13).  
 The determinacy principle of legal rules constitutes the directive directed to the 
legislator, imposing on him the obligation to make law in compliance with “the canon 
of legislative works” binding in a legally based state. Currently in Poland the regulation 
of the Prime Minister of the 20th of June 2002 concerning “the Principles of Legislative 
Technique” is of such nature94.95 The annex to this act includes a set of directives of a 
technical nature (and also partly of a didactic nature) specifying the ways in which the 
drafts of normative acts, especially laws and ordinances, should be edited in terms of 
logic and language96. The necessity of the legislator’s adherence to directives included 
in the regulation was aptly expressed by D. Salitra97, according to whom “the consistent 
application of these rules by all entities which enact law (…) ensures a considerable 
degree of uniformity of formulating the normative acts, and this in turn facilitates the 
interpretation of legal texts and contributes to the development of the state of legal 
certainty and legal safety of citizens” (Salitra 2003, 47). Due to the fact that the act is a 
part of the system of legal sources, the edition of a legal rule contrary to the directives 
included in the discussed annex to the regulation may lead to the legislative 
incorrectness of the normative act in which it was included. In consequence, this 
incorrectness may lead to the lack of precision and clarity of regulations, and in effect to 
the violation of the determinacy principle of legal rules. Such a situation may result in 
the violation of the principle of competent legislation and the regulation may be deemed 
to be against the principle of a legally based state specified in article 2 of the 
Constitution and removed from the legal system (Wronkowska 1990, 7). 
 To sum up the deliberations concerning the determinacy principle of legal rules 
it should be stressed once again that its content does not have any limited scope and it is 
still being developed. The latest jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal indicates the 
extension of understanding of the principle beyond the procedural aspect of making 
laws. It results in establishing the postulate, which stipulates that the determinacy 
principle of legal rules may constitute the basis for the constitutional control of purpose 
and rationality of the legislator’s actions (judgments with the file reference numbers K 
14/03 (OTK2004/1A/1), K 28/02 (OTK 2003/2A/13), quoted in: Zalasiński 2008, 208-209). 
                                                          
94 Dz. U. 2003, Nr. 100, poz. 908 
95 An interesting discussion on the impact of the violation of directives included in the Principles 
of Legislative Technique on the constitutionality of a legal act was caused by the article by 
Wojtczak 2005, 97 and subsequent. More discussion i.a..: Wronkowska 2005, 89 and subsequent; 
Wierczyński 2005, 89 and subsequent; Zalasiński 2005, 94 and subsequent.; Bąkowski 2006, 92 
and subsequent. Quoted in: Zalasiński 2008, 204.  
96 The detailed description of the directives included in the enacted regulation: Wronkowska and 
Zieliński 2004, . 
97 Referring to Wronkowska 2000, 81; Wronkowska – Jaśkiewicz 2000, 11. 
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The judgment no. K 28/02 is an example here, and the Constitutional Tribunal emphasised 
in it that the principles of proper legislation, apart from the requirement for clear, precise and 
correct formulation of regulations, include also “the fundamental, in respect of the legislative 
process, stage of formulating the objectives which are to be achieved by the establishment of 
a particular legal norm. They constitute the basis for evaluating if the ultimately formulated 
legal rules properly specify a given norm and if they will be useful for the accomplishment 
of the intended objective” (quoted in: Działocha and Zalasiński 2006, 13). In the judgment P 
6/04 (OTK 2003/2A/13) it is stipulated that if the assumption of the legislator’s rationality 
constitutes a point of departure, especially the rationality of particular legal norms, then the 
rationality of the established law should be deemed to be “a component of competent 
legislation.” Here it should be stressed that broader understanding of the principle of 
competent legislation does not meet with full approval in the doctrine. The Tribunal is 
subjected to criticism for the extension of its authority to control the constitutionality of the 
legislator’s actions for rationality and purpose (which is not confirmed in the Constitution) as 
well as for the negative consequences of treating the objective principle as a blanket clause 
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